Understaning the Tito-Stalin Split free essay sample

The split between Josip Broz Tito, leader of Yugoslavia, and Joseph Stalin, head of the Soviet Union, is arguably one of the most watershed moments in Soviet history. It was a sign of a rising and powerful Yugoslavia, the first break in the Eastern bloc, and inspired a shift in Soviet policy and political thought. Focusing on the timespan from 1941 to 1948, I claim that, though the break between the two leaders was caused by a variety of factors, the root cause was Stalins prioritizing of foreign relations with the West. Stalins attempts to appease the Western powers went against Titos interests in spreading Yugoslavias influence. This is particularly true regarding Titos involvement in the Greek civil war, and his relations with Albania. It was a shock to Tito, and to the rest of the world, that Stalin decided to placate the West rather than side with Yugoslavia on these matters. We will write a custom essay sample on Understaning the Tito-Stalin Split or any similar topic specifically for you Do Not WasteYour Time HIRE WRITER Only 13.90 / page l However, realistically speaking, the Soviet Union was in no position to provoke the Western world post-World War II. Therefore, it is my thinking that the main source of friction between Stalin and Tito stemmed rom their disagreements in prioritizing good relations with the West. Background Information Leading up to the Tito-Stalin Split: From 1941 to 1948 After Stalins non-aggression pact with Germany fell through in in 1941, the USSR was pushed into the camp of the Western allies. In the April of that year, the Axis powers invaded Yugoslavia. Thus, the Yugoslav Partisan resistance, led by Marshal Tito, was left to defend the nation. The Yugoslav Partisans were extremely successful at liberating their country, especially when compared to other resistance movements in Europe,2 as the Red Army only arrived after most of the fighting had already been done. The arrival of the Soviet mission after two and a half years of delay turned out to be something of an anticlimax, and Tito himself considered the belated deployment as excess baggage. 3 Nevertheless, Yugoslav and Soviet troops together forced the Nazis to retreat behind the Yugoslav borders in 1944. The following year, the old Yugoslav monarchy was abolished, and in 1946, with Tito as its dictator, the Yugoslavs carried through their own Communist revolution,4 and did so without any help from the Soviet Union. Because of this, Titos prestige stood very high among Communists and left-wing sympathizers in Yugoslavia and throughout the world. This prestige gained Tito much loyalty and legitimacy from his supporters and would be key in making his split with Stalin possible. However, Yugoslavias communist revolution upset the agreement Stalin had made with British Prime Minister Winston Churchill in 1944. They had agreed that control over Yugoslavia would be split fifty- fifty between Britain and the USSR. Now, it was the start of the Cold War, and Yugoslavia was 100 percent on the side of the Soviet Union. For this reason, Tito was een in Britain and the United States as the most hostile and pro-Soviet of all the Communist dictators in Eastern Europe, and consequently, Just by establishing communism in Yugoslavia, was already causing some problems for Stalin. Stalin wasnt a fan of either because these issues were extremely provoking of Western involvement, something he wished to avoid. More details on the happenings are provided later on in my Evidence section, as I tie their relevance back to my thesis. In the end, Tito and Stalin broke apart because of these issues, and In 1948, the Soviet leadership expelled Yugoslavia from Cominform. 9 Official correspondence between the Soviet Party and Tito declared that the USSR cannot consider such a Communist party organization to be Marxist-Leninist, Bolshevik. 0 This provided the USSR with a rationale to cut off relations with Yugoslavia. However, these accusations had little truth to them. Ideology became an instrument of pressure and attack, a means of bargaining and Jockeying for power in Yugoslav-Soviet relations,11 whereas in actuality, The basis of the critical analysis of the Stalinist system undertaken by Titos ideological specialists, only came about a year or so after Yugoslavias expu lsion from the Cominform in 1948. 12 Thus, it was only after the split that the Yugoslav leaders set on a new path, which rejected the Soviet system and developed a new ind of socialism. 13 Literature Review: The Revisionists and the Traditionalists of the Stalin-Tito Split Though its difficult to place blame solely on either Tito or Stalin for their split, historians generally sway their opinions towards one fgure to be more at fault for the break. One historiographical camp is that Titos desire to expand Yugoslavia was the root cause of the break. Perhaps he wanted to use expansionism as a means to reject Stalins supremacy and further solidify his own dictatorship. This is the claim that historian Jeronim Perovic makes in his article The Tito-Stalin Split: A Reassessment in Light of New Evidence. With new access to the Moscow archives, his work concludes that the documents indicate that the main reason for the conflict was Stalins dismay when Tito continued to pursue an expansionist foreign policy agenda toward Yugoslavias neighbors, especially Albania, against Moscows stern advice. 14 Perovic supports his argument by first setting up a counter argument the idea that the main cause of the Tito and Stalin split was a difference in ideology and then debunking it by examining disproving evidence and emphasizing the important role Titos appetite for expansion had to play in the conflict. Yet, other historians might cite Stalin as the catalyst for the break. This camp might rationalize that it was Stalin who rejected Tito as a ta ctical decision to try and torce Yugoslavia to tully succumb to Soviet rule. Vladimir DediJers biography ot Tito, Tito Speaks, takes this very stance. A former Yugoslav partisan and friend of Tito, DediJer asserts that Stalin premeditated the break to try and weaken Yugoslavia. He writes It is clear today that Stalin prepared these steps with considerable cunning. First, he tried to draw all responsible officials in the economic field, in the Party achine, in the Army, in the IJDB into his service, so that he could then deliver the final blow and turn Yugoslavia into a Rumania, Bulgaria, or some other East European country which had met a fate like that prepared for Yugoslavia. 1 5 Both of these aforementioned camps fall into the traditionalist category of the historiography surrounding the Tito-Stalin split. By placing blame on either Tito or Stalin, the camps focus on a fundamental incompatibility between the two actors, which leads to their breachs inevitability. 16 Traditionalist thought is characterized by seeing the Tito- Stalin split as inevitable. It generally stems from analysis that was done before the Moscow achieves wer e opened (but not always, an example being Perovics article). 7 My analysis, however, falls more into the revisionist category. Revisionist work is typically derived from access to sources that became available only after the opening of the Moscow archives. Also, revisionists do not see the break-up of the Yugoslav- Soviet alliance as inevitable, and point to evidence that demonstrates Titos loyalty to Stalin and surprise at Stalins forsaking of Yugoslavia to support this claim. 8 All these factors are true of my analysis of the Tito-Stalin split. I argue that neither Stalin nor Tito bears more of the blame for their break. I fall into a camp similar to that of historian Volin MaJstorovic. His thesis: When Soviet policy makers became convinced that the American commitment to Western Europe was permanent in the wake of the Marshall Plan, Kremlin decided to Stalinize the nascent communist bloc, and it was this that caused the demise of the Yugoslav-Soviet alliance. 19 1 agree with MaJstorovic, but I emphazise the importance of the massive influx of power the West eceived after World War II rather than the impacts of Stalinization. It is my thinking that Stalin had no choice but to acknowledge the strength of the Western world, and shape his foreign policy appropriately. From this standpoint, it was crucial for Stalin to part from Tito in order to appease the Western powers, since Titos actions were not looked upon positively by the capitalist bloc (this becoming ironic once rift opened, as Tito then used Western aid against Stalin). Evidence There are several factors that fueled Stalins break with Tito, but the most significant of them relate back to Stalins tie to the West. Indeed, it was important that Stalin take heed of Western interests into account into post-World War II Soviet foreign policy. Firstly, since the Soviet Union had sided with the allies during World War II, East-West negotiations were brought about that otherwise might not have been had. As research scholar Darko Bekich explains it, The Nazi invasion of Yugoslavia in April 1941 constituted an immediate threat to Soviet security and made the Soviet Union a natural ally of Britain and France even before the faithless German attack on Russia. He continues on to say that from then on, fght for nfluence in the Balkans were an issue of much debate between the allies and the USSR 20 Thus, the East-West alliances ot World W r II nad not yet tully deteriorated into cold war, so Stalin felt obliged to engage in negotiations with his fellow allies, including negotiations relating to Yugoslavia. Still, Stalins connection with the West didnt entirely stem from post-World War II alliances; it also was derived from his caution regarding Western power. The Soviet Union was crippled by the war. Having hosted the Eastern Front of the war, the USSR suffered from the loss of up to 24,000,000 people total. It also had pursued a policy of scorched earth during the war, leading to the destruction of 31,000 industrial enterprises, 65,000 kilometers of railroad track, and ultimately $128 billion worth of damage. 21 The Soviet State Planning Chief Nikolai Voznesensky published his thesis The Economy of the USSR during World War II in 1947, and ended it by saying Not a single capitalist country in all its past history or in modern war has sustained such losses and barbaric destruction on the part of aggressor as has our homeland. 22 In contrast, the United States emerged from World War II as the new global hegemon. None of the fghting was committed on US soil, its gross national product had increased by 63 percent during the war, and it was the only country to have successfully developed atomic weapons. 23 After the war the United States also began to reverse its foreign policy from isolationism towards involvement. Backed by its military and economic might, it became the leader of the Capitalist Bloc and developed containment policy to prevent the spread of communism, which meant that the USSR would have to rebuild without the assistance of US aid. The policy of containment inspired what came to be known as the Truman Doctrine, which stated hat the US would use whatever means necessary to keep Turkey and notably Greece from falling under the sway of communism and Soviet control. Stalin recognized that the West, particularly the United States, had this immense power post-World War II, and was ready and willing to wield it to keep Eastern influences to a minimum. He also recognized that the Soviet Union was in no shape to combat this kind of power. Therefore, he was forced to consider the interests of the Western powers to safeguard his own country, and this influenced his decisions in Yugoslavia that ultimately led to his break with Tito. Since Stalin was, for the aforementioned reasons, in favor of appeasing the West, the actions Tito would take post-World War II severely distressed the head of the USSR. One of these actions was Titos involvement in the Greek civil war. He supported Greek Communist Party in the fight by bolstering them with Yugoslav aid. Perovic declares that The survival of the Greek partisans depended substantially on the scale of Yugoslav support, and the withdrawal of this support would have almost guaranteed the communist insurrection to fail. 24 This Yugoslav involvement was unsettling to Stalin, largely because of prior comittments e had made with Britain. In October, 1944, Stalin and British Prime Minister Winston Churchill negotiated what would later be called the percentages agreement. Historian Ronald Suny describes the agreement to be an explicit acknowledgement of Soviet hegemony in much of the Balkans, with Britain dominating Greece. 25 The two leaders decided that influence in Yugoslavia would be shared 50-50, the Soviets would have the upper hand in Rumainia with 75 percent influence to Britains 25 percent, and Britain would have control over Greece with 90 percent to the USSRs 10 percent. 6 Though this agreement was never formulated into an official treaty, the Soviets stayed true to this compromise atter the war was over . This is demonstrated by the fact that they did not assist the communist rebels in Greece. Suny specifies this by stating When the British occupied Greece in December 1944 and used military force to quell any pretensions of the Left to power in Greece, the Soviets sat silently by as their supporters were shot down or imprisoned. 27 However, Yugoslavia was still the poster child of Soviet satellite states in 1944. Significant signs of tension etween Stalin and Tito only began to emerge in 1947. 8 This is because the Soviet Unions attempts at diplomacy to halt Yugoslavias involvement in the Greek civil war were failing, and Stalin knew that in time this could cause dangerous international complications, in the words of Perovic. 29 He further describes the predicament by asserting that Soviet leaders sensed that victory for the Greek Communists could be achieved only through direct military intervention, which would risk a confrontation with the Western powers that were already preparing a formal military alliance. Stalin was aware that the West regarded the Greek civil war as an indication of Soviet expansionist plans. 30 So, not only did Stalin choose not to engage the Soviet Union in the Greek skirmish, he prohibited Tito from lending Yugoslav support, all in the name of not provoking the West. Perovic cites the memoirs of Yugoslav representatives to Moscow Edvard Kardell and Milovan Djilas. Both write that at the 10 February meeting [of 1948], Stalin explicitly demanded an end to the Greek rebellion. 31 This clearly shows that Stalin was prioritizing foreign relations with the West over championing fellow communists in Greece. Additionally, Stalin and Tito also disagreed when it came to Yugoslavias unification with Albania and, more broadly, Titos ambitions for a federation of the Balkan countries. 32 Tito had forged an alliance with Albania to funnel aid to the Greek communists, since it too shared a border with Greece. This was not looked upon kindly by Stalin, who already wanted to pull Yugoslavia from the Greek civil war. Furthermore, this display of Yugoslav dominance in Albania was a reflection of Titos desire to merge the state with Yugoslavia. Tito had previously discussed the concept of Yugoslav federation, consisting of Albania and also Bulgaria. However, Tito was no longer as gung-ho about a union with Bulgaria as he had been right after the war,33 and so in the immediate post-war years he switched his focus on swallowing Albania. 34 Titos hopes began to come to fruit with the Yugoslav-Albanian Treaty on Friendship and Mutual Assistance, signed July 1946. 35 Four months later, economic and customs agreements were set in stone. 36 Stalin had taken a stance in opposition to the ratification of the Treaty on Friendship and Mutual Assistance with Albania. At a Yugoslav delegation held in January 1945 Stalin asserted that fthe English understand only the language of violence, and that the treaty should be scraped in order to avoid international complications. 37 Undesirably for Stalin, Tito went ahead and ratified the treaty. In hopes of solving this dispute quietly, in January 1948 Stalin asked Tito to send a Belgrade representative to Moscow for consultations. Representative Djilas arrived on the seventeenth, and immediately Stalin had him brought to the Kremlin. There, he explained to Djilas that he was in favor of a bigger Yugoslav federation in theory. He is remembered to have said We agree with you: you ought to swallow Albania the sooner the better. 38 However, in practice Stalin knew that the Western world would see Yugoslavias incorporation of Albania as Soviet expansionism. So ne continued on to say that a tormal merger ot the two countries should be delayed until an appropriate time and format could be worked out, and should be accomplished voluntarily, not against the will of the Albanians. 39 Tito interpreted these statements as endorsement for further Yugoslav involvement in Albania. With Albanias approval he began preparing to move in two Yugoslav military divisions without consulting Moscow. Stalin was outraged by this, but fortunately the damage had not yet been done. He invited Yugoslav officials to Moscow for yet another diplomatic meeting on 10 February and demanded that Tito refrain from moving his forces into Albania. Wacheslav Molotov, one of Stalins aids, remarked that because Tito had not chosen to consult with Stalin about this deployment of forces, serious differences had arisen between the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia. At Stalins behest, Molotov read aloud a telegram that had been sent to Belgrade the month prior. It emphasized the importance of the need for the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia to sort out the mess [regarding the incorporating Albania and the Greek civil war] together in case of an Anglo-American intervention. 40 In the end, Tito did not scrap his plans to deploy his divisions to Albania, and it was this blatant rebuff that caused Stalin to formally stop negotiations with Yugoslavia. He withdrew all Soviet military and civilian advisers in 1948. The former role model Soviet satellite was expelled from the Cominform and Titoism became as condemning a term as Trotskyism. Yet, it is important to note that in every altercation Stalin had with Tito regarding Yugoslav influence in Albania, Stalins reasoning for staying out of the country was to avoid an altercation with the West. There is evidence that demonstrates that Stalin would have been in much more favor of Titos actions in Albania and Greece had it not been for his concern of Western opinion. After all, Tito was helping to spread communism through Yugoslav influence, and would possibly start an international cascade of communist revolutions by defending the Greek Communist Party from his own boarders as well as Albanias. Yet, in spite of these advantages to Titos maneuvers, they all demonstrated a spread of Soviet power to the West. Thus, Stalin chose to split with Tito and instead prioritize the foreign relations with the Western bloc. Analysis of Possible Counter Arguments A variety of counter arguments exist that stand in contrast with my assessment that Stalins prioritizing of foreign relations with the West was the main reason he split with Tito. I have mentioned two of them in my literature review. One is the idea that the Stalin-Tito split was more caused by Stalins fear of Yugoslavia gaining too much ower and rivaling the Soviet Union. The other is that Titos interest in expansion was the key cause of the collapse of his relationship with Stalin. Both schools of thought have their merits. I do not argue that their conclusions are untrue, but merely emphasize less important factors that led to the break. Though Stalin may have been uncomfortable with Yugoslavias steadily growing supremacy, there are a few facts that partially undermine the significance of his apprehension regarding its impact on his break with Tito. Indeed, Stalin was willing to compromise with Tito on the xpansionism issue. During his meeting with Djilas and Kardell on 17 January, 1948, he expressed his endorsement of a larger Yugoslavia, but emphasized that a formal merger of the two countries should be delayed until an appropriate time and format could be worked out that would not irk the West. 42 During his second meeting with the Yugoslav representatives on February 10 ne even went so tar as to put torward a plan that would form a federation comprised of Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, and Albania. He exclaimed This is the federation that should be created, and the sooner the better ight away, if possible tomorrow. 43 However, Stalin stressed the importance of not upsetting the capitalist bloc by further meddling in the Greek civil war via Albania, and instead, as a first step, ordered Yirst a federation between Bulgaria and Yugoslavia, and then both with Albania. 44 This demonstrates that Stalin wasnt extremely apprehensive about Yugoslavia expanding, but was more so worried about the Wests reaction to expa nsion into Albania specifically. Albania was an especially tricky issue because of its proximity to the Greek civil war, and American President Truman had already put forth his own doctrine in 1947, stating that the United States would support free people who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures. 45 This language refers to the USs promise of economic and military aid to Greece to keep from losing it to the Soviet sphere of influence,46 and Stalin recognized this. Though the West would not favor Yugoslavias merging with Bulgaria, it would not be as hot of an issue as the incorporating of Albania. Thus, it might be a viable alternative that would feed Yugoslavias hunger for xpansion, and not be too upsetting to the Western world. Since Stalin was willing to compromise on the expansion issue with Tito, this demonstrates that he was not so anxious about Yugoslavias increasing influence in the Balkans. Instead, the Soviet leader was more worried about angering the West, and was willing to allow Yugoslavia to gain some power in an attempt to forge a compromise that wouldnt provoke American military action. In addition, Stalins controlling policies towards Yugoslavia were not unique; during this time, the Soviet Union sought to tighten its rip on its entire sphere of influence to placate as well as demonstrate its power to the West. Thus, Stalins inflexible policies towards Yugoslavia were not exceptional, solely directed at weakening the growing Balkan giant. In the words of Perovic, Stalins dismay regarding Tito came at a time when Soviet policy toward Eastern Europe as a whole was hardening. 47 Historian Marshall Shulman sums up this policy shift in his book Stalins Forign Policy Reappriased. He starts off by saying The unsettling factor in the equation was the Soviet perception of the Western societies s inherently and intractably hostile, with the consequent conviction of the inevitability of conflict, and goes on to explain that the USSR chose to compensate for its sense of vulnerability, and consolidate Soviet control over Eastern Europe. 8 Shulman points out the irony in that th ese actions Just stimulated Western military mobilization, which is precisely what Stalin was so carefully trying to avoid. 49 MaJstorovic too writes an analysis of the Tito-Stalin split that is in agreement with Perovics and Shulmans remarks. He states that when the conflict with the West ecame a distinct possibility, Stalin decided to close ranks in the communist movement,50 and actively began to think about Stalinization of Eastern Europe at this time. 51 He defines Stalinization to be replacing the regions communists with individuals whose fortunes crucially depended on Stalin, and whose servility to Moscow was unquestionalable, and goes on to say that This was a logical extension of the Communization process, which climaxed after the Cominforms founding conference, as it assures more effective control of Eastern Europe, during a time Stalin needed his control to prevent a controntation wit ne Wes 52 So, though Yugoslavia was by far the strongest Balkan power, this did not rende r unusually restrictive policies on the part of Stalin. This makes it more difficult to interpret Stalins orders to Tito as solely stemming from his fear of a strong Yugoslavia. Because they were on par with Stalins actions towards the rest of the Soviet bloc, this alludes to the likelihood that Stalin was less concerned with only Yugoslavia and its increasing power, but rather was more concerned with all of the Eastern bloc, and how the West might perceive it on the whole. Its also unlikely that Titos desire to expand was most relevant factor in causing the break. Did Tito want to expand Yugoslavia? Yes. Was he willing to part with Stalin for the sake of expansion? No. This hypothesis can be derived from the knowledge that Tito and his followers were enthusiastic Stalinists pre-spilt. Yugoslavia was the shining example of all the Soviet satellite states for a reason. Under Titos direction, the Yugoslav Communists pursued the construction of socialism more fanatically than did their comrades in the other Eastern European states. 53 They formulated their constitution, ollectivized agriculture policies, economic planning organs, Judicial system, state bureaucracy, health care, educational systems, and even their cultural sphere closely following the Stalinist Soviet model. 4 In turn, when it came time for Yugoslavia to part with the Soviet Union, Tito and his followers were shocked; as former staunch Stalinists, they found it very hard to free themselves from their idol and to accept the new situation. 55 The only reason many of them chose to denounce Stalin post- split was out of fear of being labeled as Cominformist and disappearing off to a Yug oslav concentration camp. 6 This surprise at Stalins transition from idol to enemy indicates that Tito had no preemptive intentions of breaking relations with the Soviet dictator. Though Tito may have wanted to solidify his ictatorship and augment Yugoslavias influence, he did not want nor expect to split otttrom the Soviet Union. On the contrary, ne and his tollowers revered the head ot the Communist bloc up until they were expelled from the Cominform. Moreover, some of the most fundamental sources of friction between Stalin and Tito were from mishaps in communication, and not from reckless expansionist maneuvers. For the most part, Tito was pretty cooperative with Stalin up until February 19, 1948. To further along diplomatic solutions, he had promptly sent high-ranking delegations to Moscow to represent him at Stalins every request. The only reason he didnt come himself was because of health reasons. 61 The game changing event was Stalins order for Yugoslavia and Bulgaria to merge at the February 10 meeting. While Tito had wanted to merge with Bulgaria in part, neither country desired to do so at this point in time. Stalin had hoped that this order would have appeased Yugoslavia, but in actuality it led to Titos first refusal of a direct order from Stalin. 2 Similarly, Tito had misinterpreted Stalins approval of his annexing of Albania so long as it was done voluntarily. 63 It was this misunderstanding that led Tito to deploy his force into Albania without discussing the matter with Stalin first. This event is what called for Stalins first accusations that serious differences exist between [the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia] with regard to questions of foreign policy. 64 It is a lso what ultimately led to the February 10 meeting. These areas of miscommunication, at first glance, can easily be interpreted as evidence of Titos hunger for expansion. However, upon closer inspection, one can see that they are merely misunderstandings in diplomatic rhetoric. From this perspective, Tito wasnt really acting as a power-hungry xpansionist, but was influenced by misconceptions. Plus, even if Stalin had interpreted Titos actions as expansionist desire, he was less concerned about Yugoslavia expanding and more concerned about how this would look to the West. This is evident by his attempt to merge Yugoslavia with Bulgaria, and not with Albania. From this, we learn that Stalin wasnt afraid of a bigger, stronger Yugoslavia; rather, he did not want to trifle with the delicate issue that was the Greek civil war, and take the chance of involving the West. Conclusion Its difficult to know with certainty Stalins motivations regarding his split with Tito. Pinpointing exactly what was the biggest contributing fact to his denouncing of Tito is still one of the most highly contested topics of the Tito-Stalin split, even after the opening of the Moscow archives. Even Djilas, who met Stalin on several occasions for Soviet-Yugoslav negotiations, admits that Not even today am I clear on Stalins motives Perhaps he thought that to create still another Communist state- Greece- in the Balkans, when not even the others were reliable and subservient, could hardly have been in his interest, to say nothing of possible international omplications, which were becoming more and more threatening and even if they did not drag him into war, they might endanger positions he already had won. 65 This being the case, my thesis is somewhat lacking in primary source evidence, as Stalin was not one to dictate his fears, especially when then concerned Western dominance. However, this is not to say that too little evidence exists to make the case that the break was caused by his prioritizing of foreign relations with the West. Other theories that the break was rooted in a specific action done by either Stalin or Tito ave worth ot course, but they tail to tully explain os idolization ot Stalin, and generally dont take into account the communication errors between Tito and Stalin. They are also flawed in that they dont contextualize the split within the bigger picture of East-West interaction. It is for this reason I have chosen to emphasize the importance of Stalins thoughts on the West, and how they informed his decisions regarding Tito. This also explains why I focus mostly on the areas of contention surrounding the Yugoslav relationship with Albania and the involvement in the Greek civil war. Both these sources of disagreement between him and Stalin played key roles leading up to Yugoslavias expulsion from the Cominform, and not coincidentally are intertwined with Soviet-Western relations. To conclude, I speculate that an undertaking of further research into primary source documents would certainly strengthen my argument. Perhaps in time, as the Moscow archives open up more and more, more material will be available to illuminate Stalins thoughts on parting from Tito. Until then, I find that emphasizing his concern about Western strength and opinion is a most reasonable explanation for his decision to break from Tito.